We review the recent work on interest rate setting, which emphasizes the desirability of designing policy to ensure stability under learning. Appropriately designed expectations-based rules can yield optimal rational expectations (REs) equilibria that are both determinate and stable under learning. Some simple instrument rules and approximate targeting rules also have these desirable properties. We discuss various complications in implementing optimal policy, including the observability of key variables and the required knowledge of structural parameters. An additional issue that we take up concerns the implications of expectation shocks not arising from transitional learning effects.
rules such as variants of the Taylor rule are also widely considered, and discussions focus in part on whether or not the short-term nominal interest rate should react to forecasts of inflation and/or the output gap. Theoretical studies have shown that there are two potential difficulties that monetary policy design must confront.
First, the proposed interest rate rules may not perform well when the expectations of the agents are initially out of equilibrium, e.g. as a result of structural shifts. The consequences of temporary errors in forecasting, and the resulting correction mechanisms, have been studied in recent research using the adaptive learning approach. 2 For monetary policy Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) show that certain standard forms of optimal interest rate setting by the Central Bank can lead to instability as economic agents unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time, with the result that the economy may not converge to the desired rational expectations equilibrium (REE) . They also propose a new method of implementing optimal policy that always leads to stability under learning. Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider the stability of equilibria when monetary policy is conducted using variants of the Taylor interest rate rule. Bullard and Mitra argue that monetary policy making should take into account the learnability constraints, which imply constraints on the parameters of policy behavior. 3 Second, monetary policy rules, including some formulations for optimal setting of the instrument and some Taylor rules based on forecasts of inflation and/or output gap, can lead to indeterminacy of equilibria, as discussed further below. Under indeterminacy there are multiple, even continua of REE and the economy need not settle on the desired REE. The possible rest points can be studied using stability under learning as a selection criterion, see e.g. Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) . We note that indeterminacy is not a critical problem if the fundamental REE is the only stable equilibrium under learning. Moreover, indeterminacy need not arise if the forward-looking interest rate rule is carefully designed, see Bullard and Mira (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) .
In this paper we review recent results on the performance of interest rate rules using stability under learning as the key criterion (though we also provide some discussion of determinacy of equilibria). We consider both target rules that are optimal either under commitment or discretion and also instrument rules that do not explicitly aim for optimality. The latter include extensions or variants of the rule proposed by Taylor (1993) as well as approximate targeting rules suggested recently by McCallum and Nelson (2000) .
After reviewing the theoretical results we take up a number of practical concerns that can arise when forecast-based rules for interest rate setting are employed. The first issue is observability of relevant variables. Issues of nonobservability can arise in connection with private forecasts that are needed for the desired implementation of optimal policy suggested by Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) , as well as with current output and inflation data as noted in Bullard and Mitra (2002) and McCallum and Nelson (2000) . Second, we introduce expectation shocks and study whether they affect the conclusions derived when these shocks are absent. The third concern is knowledge of the structure of the economy that is required for implementation of optimal interest rate policies. We extend the analysis of optimal commitment policy under private agent learning to a situation in which the central bank estimates the structural parameters of the economy and uses these estimates in their rule for setting interest rates.
THE MODEL
We use a linearized model that is standard in the literature, e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) . The original nonlinear framework is based on a representative consumer and a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. Firms are subject to constraints on the frequency of price changes, as originally suggested by Calvo (1983) . 4 The behavior of the private sector is summarized by the two equations
which is the "IS" curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer optimization, and
which is the price-setting rule for the monopolistically competitive firms. Here x t and π t denote the output gap and inflation rate for period t, respectively. i t is the nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from the steady state real interest rate. The determination of i t will be discussed below. E * t x tϩ1 and E * t π tϩ1 denote private sector expectations of the output gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these expectations need not be rational [E t without * denotes rational expectations (RE)]. The parameters ϕ and λ are positive, and β is the discount factor with 0 Ͻ β Ͻ 1.
For brevity we do not discuss details of the derivation of Equations (1) and (2). It should be pointed out that the derivation is based on individual Euler equations under (identical) subjective expectations, together with aggregation and definitions of the variables; see Evans and Honkapohja (2002a) for a further discussion. The Euler equations for the current period give the decisions as functions of the expected state next period. Rules for forecasting the next period's values of the state variables are the other ingredient in the description of individual behavior. Given forecasts, agents make decisions according to the Euler equations. 5 The shocks g t and u t are assumed to be observable and follow
where
are independent white noise. g t represents shocks to government purchases and/or potential output. u t represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those entering through x t . For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that µ and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
The recent literature on monetary policy has focused on interest rate setting by the Central Bank.
6 One approach examines "instrument rules" that specify i t in terms of key macroeconomic variables without explicit consideration of policy optimization. A prominent example of this type is the standard Taylor (1993) rule, i.e.
where π is the target level of inflation and the target level of the output gap is zero. (Recall that i t is specified net of the real interest rate, which in the standard Taylor rule is usually set at 2%.) More generally Taylor-type rules are of the form i t ϭ χ 0 ϩ χ π π t ϩ χ x x t . For convenience (and without loss of generality) we will take the inflation target to be π ϭ 0 so that this class of rules takes the form
Variations of the Taylor rule replace π t and x t by lagged values or by forecasts of current or future values, e.g. in the former case by
Alternatively, interest rate policy can be derived explicitly to maximize a policy objective function. This is frequently taken to be of the quadratic loss form, i.e.
E t͚
where π is the inflation gap. This type of optimal policy is often called "flexible inflation targeting" in the current literature, see e.g. Svensson (1999 Svensson ( , 2003 . The policymaker is assumed to have the same discount factor β as the private sector. α is the relative weight placed by the policymaker on the output target, and strict inflation targeting would be the case α ϭ 0. The loss Function (6) can alternatively be viewed as a quadratic approximation to the welfare function of a representative agent; see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003) .
The literature on optimal policy distinguishes between optimal discretionary policy, in which the policymaker is unable to commit to policies for future periods, and optimal policy in which such commitment is possible. Without commitment policy is reoptimized each period and reduces to a sequence of static problems in which the Central Bank aims to minimize (π t Ϫ π ) 2 ϩ αx 2 t subject to Equation (2). This leads to the first-order condition λ(π t Ϫ π ) ϩ αx t ϭ 0. Again, for convenience and without loss of generality we set π ϭ 0 so that the optimality condition is λπ t ϩ αx t ϭ 0 .
Under commitment the policymaker can do better because of the effect on private expectations. Solving the problem of minimizing Function (6) subject to Equation (2) holding in every period, and assuming RE, leads to a series of first-order conditions for the optimal dynamic policy. This policy exhibits time inconsistency, in the sense that policymakers would have an incentive to deviate from the policy in the future, but performs better than discretionary policy. Assuming that the policy has been initiated at some point in the past, and again setting π ϭ 0, the first-order condition specifies
in every period.
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Neither Condition (7) for optimal discretionary policy nor Condition (8) for optimal policy with commitment is a complete specification of monetary policy, since one must still look for an i t rule (also called a "reaction function") that implements the policy. It turns out that a number of interest rate rules are consistent with the model Equations (1) and (2), the optimality Condition (7) or (8), and RE. However, and this point is fundamental, some of the ways of implementing "optimal" monetary policy lead the economy vulnerable to either indeterminacy or instability under learning or both, while other implementations are robust to these difficulties.
The implementations of optimal policy that we will consider can be divided into "fundamentals-based" and "expectations-based" rules. The fundamentals-based rule depends only on the observable exogenous shocks g t and u t in the case of discretionary policy, i.e.
Under policy with commitment the fundamentals-based rule must also depend on x t-1 so that
where the optimal coefficients are determined by the structural parameters and the policy objective function. The coefficients ψ i are chosen so that the effects of aggregate demand shocks g t are neutralized and so that for inflation shocks u t the optimal balance is struck between output and inflation effects. In Rule (10) the dependence of i t on x t-1 is optimally chosen to take advantage of the effects on expectations of commitment to a rule. Calculation of the coefficients ψ i requires first calculating the optimal REE and then inserting the solution into the IS curve (Equation 1) to obtain the i t rule of the desired form. These steps are summarized in Appendix A. Expectations-based optimal rules are advocated in Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) . They argue that fundamentals-based optimal rules will often be unstable under learning, as discussed below. However, if private expectations are observable then they can be incorporated into the interest rate policy rule. If this is done appropriately the REE will be stable under learning and thus optimal policy can be successfully implemented. Optimal expectations-based rules take the form
( 1 1 ) under discretion or
under commitment. The specific coefficients will be derived below. The essence of these rules is that they do not assume RE on the part of private agents, but are designed to feed back on private expectations in such a way that they generate convergence to the optimal REE under learning. (If expectations are rational, these rules deliver the optimal REE.) Finally, we will also examine the types of rule introduced by McCallum and Nelson (2000) , which aim to approximate optimal policy using an interest rate rule based on x t and π t . McCallum and Nelson (2000) consider instrument rules of the form
where θ Ͼ 0. The term in square brackets measures the deviation from satisfaction of the first-order Condition (8) for optimal policy with commitment. Under this rule the interest rate is raised when inflation is above the value corresponding to Condition (8). From now on we will call this rule simply the approximate targeting rule. For reasons discussed below, McCallum and Nelson (2000) also examine a forwardlooking version of this rule.
Given an interest rate rule we can obtain the reduced form of the model and study its properties under RE. The properties in which we are interested are determinacy (uniqueness) of the RE solution and stability under learning of the REE of interest. In particular, we view the learnability of the REE targeted by the policymaker as a key requirement of good policy.
DETERMINACY AND STABILITY UNDER LEARNING
Consider the system given by Equations (1)- (3), and one of the i t policy Rules (4) , (5), (9) 
for appropriate matrices M, N, and P. In the case of Rules (4), (9), and (11) we have N ϭ 0 and thus the simpler system
The first issue of concern is whether under RE the system possesses a unique stationary REE, in which case the model is said to be "determinate." If instead the model is "indeterminate," so that multiple stationary solutions exist, these will include "sunspot solutions," i.e. REE depending on extraneous random variables that influence the economy solely through the expectations of the agents. The possibility of interest rate rules leading to indeterminacy was demonstrated in Bernanke and Woodford (1997) , Woodford (1999b) , and Svensson and Woodford (2003) . This issue was further investigated in Bullard and Mitra (2002) , and Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) . 8 The second issue concerns stability under adaptive learning. If private agents follow an adaptive learning rule, such as least squares, will the RE solution of interest be stable, i.e. reached asymptotically by the learning process? If not, the REE is unlikely to be attained. This is the focus of the papers by Mitra (2001, 2002) , Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) , and others.
General Methodology
Consider first the Reduced form (15) under RE. It is well known that the condition for determinacy is that both eigenvalues of the 2 × 2 matrix M lie outside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary solution will be of the "minimal state variable" (or MSV) form
where c is a 2 × 2 matrix that is easily computed. If instead one or both roots lie inside the unit circle then the model is indeterminate. There will still be a solution of the MSV form, but there will also be other stationary solutions.
Next consider the system under learning. Suppose that agents believe that the solution is of the form
but that the 2 × 1 vector a and the 2 × 2 matrix c are not known but instead are estimated by the private agents. Equation (16) is called the "Perceived Law of Motion" or PLM of the agents. Note that we now include an intercept vector because, although for theoretical simplicity we have translated all variables to have zero means, in practice agents will need to estimate intercept as well as slope parameters.
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With this PLM and parameter estimates (a, c) agents would form expectations as
where either F is known or is also estimated. Inserting these expectations into Reduced form (15) and solving for y t we get the implied "Actual Law of Motion" or ALM, i.e. the law that y t would follow for a fixed PLM (a, c). This is given by
We have thus obtained an associated mapping from PLM to ALM given by
and (0, c) is a fixed point of this map. Under real-time learning the sequence of events is as follows. Private agents begin period t with estimates (a t , c t ) computed on the basis of data through t -1. Next, exogenous shocks v t are realized and private agents form expectations E * t y tϩ1 ϭ a t ϩ c t Fv t (assuming for convenience that F is known). Following, for example, Rule (9) or (11) the central bank sets the interest rate i t , and y t is generated according to Equations (1) and (2) together with the interest rate rule. This temporary equilibrium is summarized by Reduced form (15) . 10 Then at the beginning of t ϩ 1 agents use the last data point to update their parameter estimates to (a tϩ1 , c tϩ1 ), e.g. using least squares, and the process continues. (Section 5 gives details on the form of the least squares algorithm.) The question of interest is whether over time
It turns out that the answer to this question is given by the E-stability principle, which advises us to look at the differential equation
where τ denotes notional time. If the REE (0, c) is locally asymptotically stable under this differential equation then the REE is stable under least squares and closely related learning rules. Conditions for local stability of this differential equation are known as expectational stability or "E-stability" conditions. We will also refer to these stability conditions as the "conditions for stability under adaptive learning" or just the "conditions for stability under learning."
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For the Reduced form (15) it can be shown that the E-stability conditions are that (1) the eigenvalues of M have real parts less than 1 and (2) all products of eigenvalues of M times eigenvalues of F have real parts less than 1. It follows that for this reduced form the conditions for stability under adaptive learning are implied by determinacy but not vice versa. This is not, however, a general result. For some reduced forms E-stability is a stricter requirement than determinacy and in other reduced forms neither condition implies the other.
Consider next the Reduced form (14). Standard techniques are available to determine whether the model is determinate. The procedure is to rewrite the model in first-order form and compare the number of nonpredetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward-looking matrix that lie inside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary solution takes the MSV form
for appropriate values (a, b, c) ϭ (0, b, c) . (In the indeterminate case there are multiple solutions of this form, as well as non-MSV REE.)
To examine stability under learning we treat Equation (17) as the PLM of the agents. Under real-time learning agents estimate the coefficients a, b, and c of Equation (17). This is a vector autoregression (VAR) with exogenous variables v t . The estimates (a t , b t , c t ) are updated at each point in time by recursive least squares. Once again it can be shown that the E-stability principle gives the conditions for local convergence of real-time learning.
For E-stability we compute the mapping from the PLM to the ALM as follows. The expectations corresponding to Equation (17) are given by
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when forming expectations, as including v t and y t-1 but not y t . (Alternative information assumptions are straightforward to consider. See Evans and Honkapohja, 2002a, for details.) This leads to the mapping from PLM to ALM given by
E-stability is again determined by the differential equation
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least squares learning. For further details see chapter 10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , Mitra (2001, 2002) , and Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) .
Results for Monetary Policy
We now describe the determinacy and stability results for the interest rate rules described in Section 1. Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider Taylor-type rules and find that the results are sensitive to whether the i t rule conditions on current, lagged, or expected future output and inflation. In addition to assuming that χ π , χ x ≥ 0 they assume that the serial correlation parameters in F are nonnegative. For the Rule (4) the results are particularly straightforward and natural. Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that the REE is determinate and stable under learning if and only if 12 (using our notation)
In particular, if policy obeys the "Taylor principle" that χ π Ͼ 1, so that nominal interest rates respond at least one for one with inflation, then determinacy and stability are guaranteed.
If lagged or forward-looking Taylor rules are used the situation is more complicated. Full analytical results are not available, but Bullard and Mitra (2002) investigate the issues numerically using a calibrated version of the model. Under Rule (5) they find that for χ π Ͼ 1 and χ x Ͼ 0 sufficiently small the policy leads to an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. For χ π Ͼ 1 but χ x too large the system is explosive. For χ π Ͻ 1 the possibilities include regions of χ π , χ x space that are determinate but unstable. Bullard and Mitra (2002) also look at forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule, taking the form
where we can interpret E * t π tϩ1 and E * t x tϩ1 as identical one step ahead forecasts, based on least squares updating, used by both private agents and policymakers. Again they find that for χ π Ͼ 1 and χ x Ͼ 0 sufficiently small the policy leads to an REE that is determinate and stable under learning. Now for χ π Ͼ 1 and χ x large the system is indeterminate, yet the MSV solution is stable under learning (while for χ π Ͻ 1 there are regions in which the system is indeterminate, but the MSV solution is not stable).
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The Bullard and Mitra (2002) results emphasize the importance of the Taylor principle in obtaining stable and determinate interest rate rules. At the same time their results show that stability under learning must not be taken for granted, even when the system is determinate so that a unique stationary solution exists. The parameters of the policy rule χ π , χ x must be appropriately selected by the policymaker when an instrument rule describes policy. Stability under learning provides a constraint for this choice.
As outlined above, in Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) we focus on optimal monetary policy and obtain striking negative results for fundamentals-based policy Rules (9) and (10). Under optimal discretionary policy, with i t Rule (9), the system is invariably unstable under private agent learning (the system is also invariably indeterminate in this case). The basic intuition for this result is that, say, upward mistakes in E * t π tϩ1 lead to higher π t , both directly and indirectly through lower ex ante real interest rates, which under learning sets off a cumulative movement away from REE. One might hope that the feedback from x t-1 under Rule (10), the fundamentals-based i t rule with commitment, would stabilize the economy. However, we show that with this policy rule, as well, the economy is invariably unstable under learning. This is the case even though with this rule there are regions in which the optimal REE is determinate.
14 In summary, the fundamentals-based policy fails to meet the learnability constraint that we set out as an essential requirement for good policy. (In this sense the term "fundamentals-based optimal policy rule" would be a misnomer.)
The instability of the fundamentals-based rules, designed after all to obtain optimal policy, is deeply worrying and serves as a strong warning to policymakers not to automatically assume that RE will be attained. It is necessary to examine explicitly the robustness of contemplated policy rules to private agent learning. In Evans and Honkapohja (2002a, 2003a) we show how the problems of instability and indeterminacy can be overcome if private agents' expectations are observable, so that interest rate rules can be in part be conditioned on these expectations. We now look for appropriate Rules of the form (11) and (12). We focus here on the case in which policymakers can operate under commitment.
The desired rule is obtained by combining the IS curve (Equation 1), the pricesetting Equation (2) and the first-order optimality Condition (8), treating the private expectations as given. Eliminating x t and π t from these equations, but not imposing the RE assumption, leads to an interest rate equation of the form (Rule 12) with coefficients
Under optimal discretionary policy the first-order Condition (7) is used instead, and the coefficients are identical except that δ L ϭ 0. Under this expectations-based optimal rule we obtain equally striking positive results. For all possible structural parameter values the system is determinate and the optimal REE is stable under private agent learning. The key to the stability results is the feedback from expectations to interest rates, so that deviations from RE are offset by policy and in such a way that under learning private agents are guided over time to form expectations consistent with the optimal REE. Our expectations-based rule obeys a form of the Taylor principle since δ π Ͼ 1. Note that our optimal policy rule conditions on both private expectations and observable exogenous shocks, as well as lagged output. 15 We also remark that, when computing the optimal expectations-based rule, it is important for the central bank to use the correct structural model of the IS and price-setting relationships, which in turn depend on the specific form of boundedly rational individual behavior.
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As discussed above, the targeting rule of McCallum and Nelson (2000) has been recommended as an approximation to optimal policy. In Evans and Honkapohja (2002a) we numerically investigate Rule (13) and find that it is also invariably determinate and stable under learning. Since it can be shown that for large θ Ͼ 0 the resulting REE will be close to the optimal REE, this also provides an attractive policy rule. Because Rule (13) requires contemporaneous observations, which may not be available, McCallum and Nelson (2000) recommend a forward-looking version of the approximate targeting rule. Stability of this rule under learning will be discussed in the next section on operationality.
Interest rate rules based on the deviation from the satisfaction of the first-order optimality Condition (8) have also been considered by Svensson and Woodford (2003) . They suggest a "hybrid" rule, the simplest form of which would be
This rule combines the fundamentals-based Rule (10) with the correction for the first-order condition as in Rule (13). 17 We have verified numerically that Rule (23) yields both determinacy and stability under learning for sufficiently high values of θ. Note that, if determinacy and stability hold, Rule (23) delivers the optimal REE.
Finally, we remark that our discussion has been limited to formulations of monetary policy in terms of interest rate rules. Alternatively, policy could be formulated as a money supply rule, a prominent example of which is the Friedman proposal for k-percent money growth. Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) show that Friedman's rule always delivers determinacy and E-stability in the standard New Keynesian model. However, it does not perform well in terms of the policy objective function. A more systematic study of the performance of money supply rules remains to be done.
OPERATIONALITY
Many of the i t rules discussed above have the potential difficulty that they may not be operational, as discussed in McCallum (1999) . For example, McCallum and Nelson (2000) note that it may be unrealistic to assume that policymakers can condition policy on current x t and π t . Similarly, one could question whether accurate observations on private expectations are available. We consider these points in the reverse order.
In the subsequent discussion we focus on the expectations-based Rule (12) and the approximate targeting Rule (13).
Observability of Private Expectations
Our recommended expectations-based rule requires observations of current private expectations of future variables. Survey data on private forecasts of future inflation and various measures of future output do exist but there are concerns about the accuracy of this data. If observations of expectations are subject to a white noise measurement error then our stability and determinacy results are unaffected. Furthermore, if measurement errors are small then the policy will be close to optimal. However, if measurement errors are large then this will lead to a substantial deterioration in performance. In this case one might consider substituting a proxy for such observations. Since we are assuming that private agents forecast by running VARs, the most natural proxy is for the Central Bank to estimate corresponding VARs and use these in Rule (12). Clearly, if this precisely describes agents' forecasts then it is equivalent to observing these expectations. However, we can consider less extreme cases in which agents and the Central Bank begin with different initial estimates and/or use data sets with different initial dates.
For the case of optimal discretionary policy and forward-based instrument rules this issue was analyzed in Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) . We here show that using VAR proxies can also achieve convergence to the optimal REE with commitment. Before proceeding with this analysis we note that in the case in which private expectations are observed and incorporated into our expectations-based Rule (12), the Reduced form is given by (14) with
, and
, and that Evans and Honkapohja (2002a) show that this reduced form leads to stability and determinacy. When the private agents and the Central Bank are separately estimating and forecasting using VARs, we must distinguish between their expectations. An extended E-stability analysis can give the conditions for convergence of learning, as shown in . In the current context this is done as follows. Equations (1) and (2) It is easily verified that the implied ALM is of the form
with the associated map from the PLMs to the ALM
Because the P and CB parameters are mapped into the same ALM parameters, it can be shown that the E-stability conditions are identical to those that obtain if forecasts are identical in the model, i.e. in which the coefficient matrix on the expectations E * t y tϩ1 is M P ϩ M CB . This is identical to the earlier reduced form under the interest rate Rule (12). Hence we have stability here as well. 
Nonobservability of Current Data
As pointed out by McCallum and Nelson (2000) , a difficulty with the approximate targeting Rule (13) is that it presupposes that the policymaker can observe current output gap and inflation when setting the interest rate. McCallum and Nelson (2000) recommend use of forward-looking versions of approximate targeting rules. In this case the policymaker adjusts the current interest rate in response to the discrepancy from the optimality Condition (8) anticipated for the next period, i.e.
This requires specification of E CB t (·) and we consider the case where both the Central Bank and private agents use forecasts based on identical estimated VARs,
It turns out that determinacy and stability under learning are no longer guaranteed if the Rule (26) is employed. Numerical results indicate that sufficiently large values of the policy parameter θ induce both instability under learning and indeterminacy. This is unfortunate since large values of θ are needed to achieve a close approximation to optimal policy. We therefore focus on the upper bound on θ required to avoid instability and compare the performance of Rule (26) in terms of welfare loss against the welfare loss under optimal policy.
We consider the performance of the Rule (26) for different numerical calibrations of the model, Calibration W: β ϭ 0.99, ϕ ϭ (0.157) -1 , and λ ϭ 0.024; Calibration CGG: β ϭ 0.99, ϕ ϭ 4, and λ ϭ 0.075; Calibration MN: β ϭ 0.99, ϕ ϭ 0.164, and λ ϭ 0.3; due to Woodford (1999b) , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , and McCallum and Nelson (1999) , respectively. 19 We also set α ϭ 0.3, ρ ϭ 0.4, µ ϭ 0.4, σ g ϭ 1, and σ u ϭ 0.5. Here x t and π t are expressed in percentage units. The values for σ g and µ are broadly consistent with those obtained in McCallum and Nelson (1999) . The value for σ u is close to that used by McCallum and Nelson (2000) . The latter paper uses a wide range of values for ρ and our choice is in the middle of this range. Seriously calibrating these parameters to the data would require their values to be contingent on both ϕ and λ as well the policy rule. Because we want to compare the performance of different policy rules for given structural parameters, we must in any case fix the underlying structure of the model and therefore we simply adopt the above values as a benchmark for numerical computations.
For the different calibrations the value of the welfare loss from Rule (26), with θ set optimally under the E-stability constraint, 20 and for the optimal REE are as given in Table 1 , where "AT" and "EB" refer to approximate targeting and optimal expectations-based rules, respectively. Here θ AT is the critical value above which Rule (26) leads to instability. Note that we use the term welfare loss to refer to the value of the objective Function (6), although strictly speaking this is appropriate only when Function (6) is interpreted as the approximate welfare loss of the representative agent. (Technical details for computing the welfare loss are given in Appendix B.) These results show that there are sometimes substantial welfare losses from using the E-stable forward-looking AT rule that can be avoided if the EB rule is feasible.
EXPECTATION SHOCKS
In this section we introduce another potential problem with private expectations. It is assumed that, though private agents are learning as before, their actual 
where ε′ t ϭ (ε x,t , ε π,t ) is a shock to private expectations that is for simplicity assumed to be iid. The forecasts of the Central Bank are
where κ ϭ 0 or 1, depending on whether the Central Bank is able to obtain precise information on the expectation shocks. For the case of the expectations-based Rule (12) the modified reduced form is
For the approximate targeting Rule (26) the Reduced form (27) changes to
We note that E-stability and determinacy properties of the models are not affected by the expectation shocks. From the Reduced forms (28) and (29) we next calculate welfare losses due to unobserved expectations shocks. We make no attempt to calibrate the variances of the expectations shocks and instead illustrate the results for different values emphasizing the sensitivity to the size of the inflation shock. We begin with the case where the standard deviation of the expectation shocks in output gap and inflation are 0.1 and 0.05, respectively. The welfare losses for Rules (12) and (26) with the different calibrations are as given in Table 2 . Comparing these results to the preceding section it is seen that expectation shocks result in an increase in the losses under either rule. The computed losses suggest that the expectations-based optimal rule seems to perform better than the forward-looking approximate targeting rule.
However, the comparison could go the other way if there are big shocks to inflation expectations. We now increase the standard deviation for inflation expectation shocks first to 0.1 and then to 0.2. In these cases the welfare losses are as shown in Table  3 when the standard deviation for the inflation shock is 0.1, and as shown in Table 4 when the standard deviation for the inflation shock is 0.2. It is seen that Rule (26) can deliver a smaller loss than Rule (12) if the shocks to inflation expectations are sufficiently high; see the results for the W calibration.
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Finally, we note that if the Central Bank has accurate information on the expectation shocks then the welfare loss from the expectations-based Rule (12) is dramatically improved. We illustrate this for the last case in which the standard deviation of the output expectation shock is 0.1 and the standard deviation of the inflation expectation shock is 0.2. Formally, setting κ ϭ 1 we obtain the results as shown in Table 5 . These welfare losses remain somewhat higher than the minimum losses without the expectation shocks, which were, respectively, 0.755, 0.617, and 0.296 for the three calibrations. Though the rule with κ ϭ 1 can neutralize fully the shocks to output gap expectations (see Reduced form (28)), this is not the case for the shocks to inflation expectations. These results nonetheless illustrate the value of policy being able to condition on accurate observations of private expectations.
ESTIMATION OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
In Section 3.1 we investigated central bank learning of the reduced form VAR as a way for providing a proxy for private forecasts. However, we note that implementation of our expectations-based optimal rule (as well as the approximate targeting rule) also requires knowledge of structural parameters. This is apparent from the coefficients of the expectations-based optimal rule given in Equation (22). A question of considerable interest is whether policymakers can obtain consistent estimates of λ and ϕ when private agents are estimating the coefficients of the VAR used in forming their expectations. We take up this issue in the context of the expectationsbased rule and focus for convenience on the case in which private expectations are observed by the central bank. In Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) we showed that consistent estimation of the structural parameters was possible in the case of optimal discretionary policy. Here we show how to carry out this procedure in the context of policy with commitment and we do so in a setting that requires instrumental variable estimation.
First, we extend the model to allow for unobserved shocks. The IS and pricesetting equations now take the form
where x t , π t , e x,t , and e π,t are not observable at time t. g t , u t are observable at t and x t , π t are observed with a lag. It is assumed that the unobserved shocks (e x,t , e π,t ) are bivariate white noise, but we will allow for the possibility that the components are contemporaneously correlated. (g t , u t ) and (e x,t , e π,t ) are exogenous and are assumed to be mutually independent. Private expectations are assumed to be observable and to be governed by least squares learning as above. We assume that β and α are known, but the key structural parameters ϕ and λ must be estimated by the policymaker. The optimal REE now takes the form
where e ′ t ϭ (e x,t , e π,t ). Private agent learning is as before, with agents using least squares to estimate the parameters a, b, and c of the PLM (Equation 17). Thus, at time t agents use the PLM y t ϭ a t ϩ b t y tϪ1 ϩ c t ν t ϩ η t to forecast y tϩ1 using the forecast Function (18) with (a, b, c) replaced by (a t , b t , c t ). To study the system under real-time learning we express the least squares estimation in recursive form as follows. Define the matrix of parameters ξ′ ϭ (a, b, c) and the vector of state variables z ′ t ϭ (1, y′ tϪ1 , v ′ t ). The recursive least squares algorithm is
The R t equation updates estimates of the matrix of second moments of the regressors z t . The parameters ξ t are updated using this matrix and the regression errors y tϪ1 Ϫ ξ ′ tϪ1 z tϪ1 . Note that ξ t is estimated using data through time t -1, which is the standard assumption in the literature.
To estimate the structural parameters the Central Bank constructs the variables (1) it also follows that x t depends only on g t , u t , x t-1 , and e x,t . If e x,t and e π,t were known to be uncorrelated, consistent estimates of ϕ and λ could be obtained by least squares regressions of w x,t on r t and w π,t on x t , respectively. Thus the policymaker would estimate
and
using recursive least squares. However, we can allow for the possibility that the components e x,t and e π,t are contemporaneously correlated. We thus proceed as follows.
The first Equation (32) can be estimated through least squares, since in the REE r t and e x,t are uncorrelated.
23 Formally, we can write
The second Equation (33) must be estimated by recursive instrumental variables, since x t and e π,t are correlated in the REE. The natural instrument here is x t-1 . The recursive algorithm takes the form
The Central Bank is assumed to conduct monetary policy using the optimal expectations-based Rule (12) with estimated values for the structural parameters, i.e.
The key result is that the economy converges to the optimal REE when the Central Bank uses the optimal expectations-based Rule (36) and both private agents and policymaker learn using the specified algorithms. We remark that convergence to equilibrium is local in the sense that the initial parameter estimates can be chosen freely only within a neighborhood of the RE parameter values. Appendix C outlines the proof of this result.
As noted above, this result is robust to the assumption that agents use contemporaneous values of endogenous variables in the forecasts. In this case the Equation (32) also must be estimated using recursive instrumental variables. Again x t-1 can be used as the instrument.
CONCLUSIONS
The design of monetary policy needs to take into account the possibility that the economy may not always be in a full intertemporal, i.e. RE, equilibrium. If economic agents update their forecasting procedures, the resulting process of learning may or may not lead the economy towards an REE. Convergence or nonconvergence of the learning process depends critically on the policy rule followed by the Central Bank. Thus the learnability constraint is a key criterion in designing a good policy rule.
We have reviewed recent research demonstrating that stability under learning is a serious concern. In particular, some recently proposed policy rules that depend solely on fundamentals are not conducive to convergence to equilibrium. We recommend instead expectations-based optimal rules, i.e. interest rate rules depending appropriately on private expectations as well as fundamentals, which have been shown to lead to both stability under learning and determinacy of equilibria. We have also noted that, if nonoptimal instrument rules are used instead, stability under learning imposes additional constraints on monetary policy rules, and policy design should take account of these constraints.
Implementation of interest rate rules raises several practical concerns. First, questions of observability can arise. These problems can relate to availability of current data and to forecasts of private agents. We have discussed ways for dealing with these concerns. Second, the economy may in practice be subject to expectation shocks, in addition to transitory shocks associated with learning. These will not usually alter the conditions for stability under learning, but if the shocks are sufficiently large the ranking of different policy rules can be affected. However, if private expectations are fully observable, this provides additional motivation for following our recommended expectations-based optimal rule.
Finally, implementation of expectations-based or approximate targeting policy rules requires knowledge of key structural parameters. If the Central Bank does not have this knowledge, the problem can be overcome by appropriately estimating these parameters and using the estimated parameters in the interest rate rule. In particular, we have shown that this procedure is viable for the expectations-based rule, which is locally stable under simultaneous learning by private agents and policymakers.
We hope that these rules provide useful guidelines for the design of monetary policy. However, we recognize that much further research on these issues remains to be done.
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL REE AND THE FUNDAMENTALS-BASED i t RULE
Consider the model under RE. It can be shown that the aggregate supply curve (Equation 2), the equation for u t given by Equation (3), and the optimality Condition (7) or (8) specify a unique nonexplosive solution. Consider the system under commitment, i.e. Condition (8). The unique stationary solution takes the form
where b x is the solution |b x | Ͻ 1 to βb
րα)b x ϩ 1 ϭ 0 and where b π , c x , and c π depend on the structural parameters. To obtain the fundamentals-based i t rule, the corresponding RE E t x tϩ1 and E t π tϩ1 are computed as linear functions of x t-1 and u t . Using the RE assumption, these expectation functions and the above expression for x t are substituted into the aggregate demand Equation (1) and solved for i t . This gives the fundamentals-based Rule (10), where
Details are given in Evans and Honkapohja (2002a) . In the case of discretion similar steps lead to these coefficients with ψ x ϭ b x ϭ b π ϭ 0. Details are given in Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) .
APPENDIX B: WELFARE CALCULATION
We calculate the expected welfare loss of the stationary REE, which is 1/(1 -β) times
The REE solution y t ϭ by tϪ1 ϩ cv t can be written as
where ṽ t ϭ (g t , ũ t )′ and b and c are the REE values under the specified interest rate rule, or ζ t ϭ Gζ tϪ1 ϩ Hṽ t , where ζ ′ t ϭ (y t , v t ) . Letting Σ ϭ Var(ṽ t ) denote the covariance matrix of the shocks ṽ t , the stationary covariance matrix for ξ t satisfies
The variance of output gap and inflation can be read off from Equation (B1).
APPENDIX C: CONVERGENCE UNDER STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
To demonstrate stability under the expectations-based Rule (36) when the private agents and the policymaker are simultaneously learning we apply the stochastic approximation tools described in chapters 6 and 7 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . The key results in stochastic approximation state that conditions for local convergence of the recursive stochastic algorithms are given by the local asymptotic stability conditions for a system of associated differential equations. The steps required for deriving the associated differential equations for the stochastic recursive system are given in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
It can be shown that for the parameters of the private agents the associated differential equations are
Here ϑ t denotes the vector of all parameters a t , b t , c t , φ t , λ IV t , and the second moment estimates. The function G(·) has the property
i.e. G(·) reduces to T(ξ) -ξ when the estimates φ ,λ IV take their true values. Here T(ξ) ϭ T (a, b, c) is the mapping from the PLM to the ALM given by Equation (19) with matrix coefficients given by Equation (24).
The associated differential equations for the Algorithms (34) and (35) are
since Er tϪ1 (ϑ)e x,tϪ1 ϭ 0, and
since Ex tϪ2 (ϑ)e π,tϪ1 ϭ 0. It should be noted that all the parameter estimates ξ, φ , λ IV , R z , R r , and R IV x in the differential equations are functions of τ, which is a virtual time concept.
To study convergence under real-time learning, one considers local asymptotic stability of the entire differential equation system at the REE ϑ * . To analyze stability of the system we first note that differential equations for all of the second moments are stable. It then follows that φ → ϕ and λ IV → λ. Using Equation (B2) it follows that stability of the system reduces to the earlier E-stability differential Equation (20) for the model with commitment. Thus we have the local stability results that the policymaker learns the structural parameters, private agents learn RE and the economy converges the optimal REE. 24 NOTES of monetary and fiscal policy can be important for the stability of equilibria under learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) and McCallum (2003) .
7. Treating the policy as having been initiated in the past corresponds to the "timeless perspective" described by Woodford (1999a Woodford ( , 1999b .
8. If the model is indeterminate, different forms of sunspot solutions exist, and one can also ask whether the sunspot solutions are stable under learning. For a general discussion see Evans and Honkapohja (2004) and for an analysis of the model at hand see Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , and Evans and McGough (2003) .
9. We remark that private agents (as well as the policymaker) are assumed to observe the shocks v t . If this were not the case, private agents would presumably instead use relevant information variables in their PLM. This type of setup, with asymmetric information, would require a separate study.
10. Reduced form (15) continues to hold in the case of the Taylor Rule (4), but y t and i t are simultaneously determined.
11. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) describes the concepts and methods for the study of adaptive learning. The eductive approach to learning, in which agents use mental reasoning, is also sometimes used, see Guesnerie (2002) for a review. The connections between stability under adaptive and eductive learning are discussed in Evans (2001) .
12. Throughout we will assume that we are not exactly on the border of the regions of determinacy or stability.
13. For interest rate Rule (21) there exist E-stable sunspot equilibria if λ(χ π Ϫ 1) ϩ (1 Ϫ β)χ x Ͼ 0 and λ(χ π Ϫ 1) ϩ (1 ϩ β)χ x Ͼ 2ϕ Ϫ1 (1 ϩ β) , see Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) . Thus policy under Rule (21) should not be "too aggressive."
14. In the case of policy with commitment the learning stability results are sensitive to the detailed information assumptions. With PLM Equation (17) if agents can make forecasts conditional also on y t then under the fundamentals-based rule there are both regions of stability and instability, depending on the structural parameters.
15. In the context of optimal discretionary policy Ferrero (2003) takes up the additional issue of the speed of convergence under least squares learning. There is a continuum of expectations-based rules of the form (Rule 11) that are consistent with the optimal discretionary REE but these can have different speeds of convergence.
16. See Preston (2002a) for the formulation of the expectations-based rule when long-horizon forecasts of private agents influence their behavior. 17. The model and the interest rate rule analyzed in Svensson and Woodford (2003) incorporate additional information lags.
18. The corresponding real-time learning stability result is somewhat sensitive to the detailed assumptions, e.g. additional restrictions are required for stability if private agents estimate parameters using stochastic gradient techniques while the Central Bank uses least squares.
19. Calibrations are for quarterly data with i t , π t measured at quarterly rates. The calibration in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , based on annualized rates, is therefore adjusted accordingly.
20. For the AT rule the "optimal" choice of θ is on the edge of the E-stability constraint. However, we remark that this choice is somewhat risky since a small error in the model parameter values could lead to instability. Moreover, this choice of θ could lead to slow convergence of real-time learning.
21. For the other calibrations the same reserval happens at higher values for the standard deviation of the inflation expectations shock.
22. The recursive formulations for the parameter estimates vary slightly from least squares since we have introduced an additional lag in the equations for the second moments. This is analytically convenient. The same results apply if R t-1 is replaced by R t in the first equation, see chapter 10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
23. Note that this holds only if agents do not use contemporaneous values of x t and π t in forming expectations E * t y tϩ1 . If instead these contemporaneous values are used by private agents, then ϕ as well as λ would have to be estimated using instrumental variables.
24. Details of the stochastic approximation convergence argument are given for the discretionary policy case in Evans and Honkapohja (2003a 
